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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Why (and How) States Should Tax the Repatriation
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
Readers of State Tax Notes know that a lot of 
income earned by the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
corporations is coming home — or rather is being 
deemed to be coming home under new IRC 
section 965. There has accordingly been a lot of 
analysis of how the tax laws of the various states 
will treat this returning income.1 In this essay, we 
take a step back and consider how state tax laws 
should treat this income. We then analyze the 
federal constitutional ground rules on taxing this 
income. We conclude that federal constitutional 
law permits states to tax the repatriated income in 
the manner we recommend based on our policy 
analysis.
Introduction: What Is the Repatriation?
The old U.S. international tax regime 
permitted multinational firms to defer payment of 
tax on most of the income they earned overseas — 
defer until the firm brought the money home. So, 
for instance, until Apple Germany sent home its 
profits to Apple U.S., those profits would not be 
subject to tax. Naturally, Apple and other 
multinationals let a lot of income hang out abroad 
— an estimated $2.6 trillion in 2015.2
To get this money to come home, a strategy 
used in 2004 was to offer a special low rate. 
“Repatriate now and pay 5.25 percent rather than 
the usual 35 percent rate” was the 2004 deal.3 The 
tax law just passed applies stronger medicine. The 
new law deems all the income held offshore to be 
repatriated and then applies a tax rate of either 8 
percent or 15.5 percent.4 The Joint Committee on 
Taxation estimates that this provision will raise 
$338 billion over 10 years.5 To return to Apple, this 
one company alone expects to pay $38 billion on 
its $252 billion of repatriated earnings.6
Darien Shanske is a professor at the 
University of California, Davis, School of Law 
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of 
law at Indiana University Maurer School of 
Law.
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on 
SALT, the authors discuss how states should 
treat income earned by the foreign subsidiaries 
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1
Kathleen K. Wright, “Repatriation: A Huge Windfall or Only a 
Modest Revenue Increase?” State Tax Notes, Apr. 2, 2018, p. 23; Peter L. 
Faber, “The Final Tax Reform Act: SALT Implications,” State Tax Notes, 
Feb. 5, 2018, p. 547; Alysse McLoughlin and Kathleen Quinn, “Tax 
Reform: What the International Provisions Mean to the States,” State Tax 
Notes, Feb. 5, 2018, p. 557; and Jeffrey A. Friedman et al., “Insight: 
Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop: State and Local Tax Implications of 
Federal Tax Reform — International Tax Provisions,” BNA Daily Tax 
Report: State, Mar. 9, 2018.
2
Letter to Honorable Kevin Brady, Joint Committee on Taxation, Aug. 
31, 2016.
3
For critical discussion of the 2004 holiday, see Chuck Marr and Chye-
Ching Huang, “Repatriation Tax Holiday Would Lose Revenue and Is a 
Proven Policy Failure,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (June 
2014). Note that the authors are much less critical about a one-time 




Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference Report 
(Dec. 2017) at Estimated Budget Effects Appendix p. 6.
6
Daisuke Wakabayashi and Brian X. Chen, “Apple, After Tax Cut 
Windfall, Will Bring Billions Back to U.S,” New York Times, Jan. 17, 2018.
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Policy: Why States Should Tax the Repatriation
We can identify at least four broad reasons 
why a state should tax the repatriation. These 
reasons are not mutually exclusive.
(1) These Earnings Are Partially Domestic
There is overwhelming evidence that at least a 
substantial portion of the earnings parked abroad 
were, in fact, earned in the United States and 
should always have been part of the domestic 
corporate tax base. For instance, consider the 
curious fact that there are a number of jurisdictions 
in which the reported profits of U.S. controlled 
subsidiaries represent multiples of the gross 
domestic product of the entire jurisdiction.7 To take 
one fun example, the profits of U.S. controlled 
subsidiaries in the Cayman Islands represented 
over 1,000 percent of that island’s GDP in 2014.8 We 
also have a pretty good idea what kinds of 
planning structures were used to create these 
results.9 These first two clues fit together, as on the 
one hand we know about the planning structure 
known as the “double Irish Dutch sandwich,” and 
we know as well that both the Netherlands and 
Ireland are home to enormous amounts of the 
profits of U.S. controlled subsidiaries relative to 
those countries’ GDPs.10 Also of note is the long-
term decline of the productivity of the corporate 
tax relative to corporate profits.11 Accordingly, a 
leading commentator concludes: “While the 
magnitude of corporate profit shifting by U.S. 
multinationals into low or no tax countries is 
uncertain, there is overwhelming evidence of its 
existence and its increase in recent years.”12
The JCT has estimated the 2017 cost of deferral 
to the U.S. fisc at $119 billion.13 Working backward 
from that estimate and assuming that the avoided 
federal rate was 35 percent, the JCT thinks that, in 
2017 alone, $340 billion in U.S. corporate profits 
did not come home. Some substantial portion of 
that $340 billion was earned in the United States.
(2) Ability-to-Pay Principle
A corporation repatriating $252 billion to the 
United States is better off than a corporation, with 
similar domestic income, that is not repatriating 
$252 billion. Because this is so, and, to the extent 
that we have a corporate income tax in order to 
apply the ability-to-pay principle to corporations, 
the repatriated earnings should be reflected in a 
corporation’s tax base.
To elaborate, although the incidence of all 
taxes ultimately falls on people, corporations 
nevertheless represent important nexuses of 
economic activity. All else being equal, large 
repatriations indicate greater economic activity 
within a particular corporate nexus that should be 
subject to tax.
(3) Progressive Taxation of Immobile Base
In general, tax policymakers must contend 
with the fact that the most progressive tax bases 
are usually the most mobile and therefore are less 
efficient to tax. This is the textbook “equity-
efficiency” trade-off.14 The problem of 
interjurisdictional mobility is especially pressing 
for states within the free trade area of the United 
States. But the deemed repatriation makes the 
most mobile of capital immobile — it must return 
and indeed it already has. Businesses cannot now 
move out of state to avoid the tax on the 
repatriation. Thus taxing the repatriation is 
efficient because the base is immobile, and it is 
progressive because some significant portion of 
the repatriation is going to enrich wealthier 
citizens.
7
“American Corporations Tell IRS That 61 Percent of Their Offshore 
Profits Are in 10 Tax Havens,” Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy 




See, e.g., Edward Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699 
(2011).
10
See id. and ITEP, supra note 7.
11
See, e.g., Hunter Blair, “Corporate Profits Are Way Up, Corporate 
Taxes Are Way Down,” Economic Policy Institute, Sept. 22, 2016; and 
Gabriel Zucman, “Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and 
Corporate Profits,” 28 Journal of Economic Perspectives 121, 133 (2014). 
Also intriguing is how much more profitable foreign controlled foreign 
corporations are relative to their domestic parents. James W. Wetzler, 
“State Responses to Tax Planning by Multinational Corporations,” State 
Tax Notes, July 21, 2014, p. 149.
12
Jane Gravelle, “Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit 
Shifting: Carrots or Sticks?” Draft Paper presented at NYU School of 
Law (Apr. 26, 2016).
13
Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax 
Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2016-2020 at 28 (Jan. 30, 2017).
14
Here is a cite to a textbook: Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and 
Public Policy 6-7, 597-600 (4th Ed. 2013).
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(4) Recouping a National Loss
One way to conceive of the huge pool of 
earnings that accumulated abroad through a 
quirk of the U.S. international tax system is that it 
represented a form of forced national savings. Say 
the $2.6 trillion had been deemed returned and 
taxed at 35 percent. This would have yielded $910 
billion that could then have gone a long way 
toward funding any number of national priorities. 
For instance, that money could have been spent 
on infrastructure or, better still, capitalizing a 
national infrastructure bank to create a large and 
permanent source of funding.15 The new tax law 
deviated from this sensible prescription in two 
ways. First, the new law subjected the repatriation 
to only a low tax rate, thereby in a sense 
squandering more than half its value as 
accumulated savings. Second, the one-time funds 
from the repatriation were used as a way to pay 
for permanent business-level tax cuts. Thus, a 
state seeking to tax the repatriation and use that 
one-time money for (say) state infrastructure 
would in a sense just be recapturing a portion of 
this squandered national wealth.
Moreover, an additional and related 
federalism angle is worth noting, one that also 
goes back to our first rationale. Ultimately, the 
peculiar, prior federal treatment of corporate 
income incentivized at least part of the erosion of 
the state corporate income tax base. This 
happened for two reasons. First, the federal 
deferral rule gave corporations an incentive to 
shift domestic profits abroad. Second, the 2004 
federal repatriation holiday and the regular 
consideration of additional holidays gave 
corporations still additional incentive to shift their 
profits abroad.16 From this perspective, states are 
not only trying to tax shifted domestic profits, but 
profits shifted because of flaws in national tax 
policy.
Constitutional Framework
Our primary concern here is not with how a 
new tax comports with current state law, but 
instead with federal constitutional ground rules. 
Here are the primary relevant federal 
constitutional ground rules, as we see them.
First, any new tax needs to be fairly 
apportioned.17 The Supreme Court has further 
explained that it is particularly concerned about 
double taxation to the extent a state tax involves 
— or might involve — foreign income.18 That said, 
the Court has upheld typical state apportionment 
formulas in this context as appropriately sensitive 
to foreign dormant commerce concerns,19 and so a 
reasonable variation on the kinds of formulas 
common in the states should likely pass muster. 
Another approach to consider is to tax the 
repatriation net of foreign taxes, especially as the 
foreign taxes imposed are in many cases not likely 
to be significant.20
Second, any new tax cannot discriminate 
against — or favor — foreign commerce.21 So, for 
instance, if a state opted to tax the repatriation at 
a higher rate than its ordinary corporate income 
tax, this would appear like the state is taxing 
foreign income at a higher rate. Arguably, just 
taxing the repatriation creates a problem if one 
conceives of the transition tax as falling on foreign 
subsidiaries but not domestic subsidiaries.22 But 
this is not the right conception if we are only 
trying to tax domestic income. If the income in 
question had been earned by a domestic 
subsidiary, it would have been taxed — and a long 
time ago — and thus there is no discrimination.
Given the sums of money involved, simply 
applying a state’s ordinary rate should yield quite 
a lot of income, but can a state impose a higher tax 
15
See Robert Puentes, Joseph Kane, and Patrick Sabol, “Establish a 
National Infrastructure Bank Capitalized by a Repatriation Tax 
Holiday,” Brookings (Aug. 2013).
16
Lisa De Simome et al., “Repatriation Taxes and Foreign Cash 
Holdings: The Impact of Anticipated Tax Reform” Draft Paper presented 
at NYU School of Law (Dec. 7, 2017).
17






IRC section 965(g) actually limits the amount of the tax credit 
available against the repatriated earning to take into account the reduced 
rate of tax applied to these earnings. Given that a state should tax these 
earnings in full, a state should grant the full credits, if that is the 
approach taken.
21
Kraft General Foods Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, 
505 U.S. 71 (1992). Note that the Kraft decision is not analytically sound 
given that domestic and foreign subsidiaries are differently situated, see 
Wetzler supra note 11, but passing a law that requires the Supreme Court 
to overturn Kraft is not a best first choice.
22
See Friedman et al. supra note 1.
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on the repatriated earnings? Again, we think so if 
a state takes the position that it is not taxing 
foreign income but domestic income.23 We have 
already seen that any state has an overwhelming 
prima facie case that this is so; all those profits 
residing in the Cayman Islands were not earned 
there. As for domestic income, states can surely 
tax that at different rates, subject to rational basis 
review.24 Thus a state could make a reasonable 
argument that it was taxing the domestic income 
represented by a share of the repatriation at a 
higher rate because this higher rate is meant as a 
deterrent for future aggressive tax planning or 
compensation for the time value of money and 
other problems caused by the deferral.
A third important point here is that the 
burden on a taxpayer challenging an 
apportionment formula is very heavy: the 
taxpayer must “prove by clear and cogent 
evidence that the income attributed to the State is 
in fact out of all appropriate proportions to the 
business transacted in that State.”25 Thus, the 
burden is not on a state to come up with the best 
possible estimate of what percentage of the 
repatriation was really earned in the United 
States. Rather, it will be the burden of the taxpayer 
to show that the state’s reasonable efforts clearly 
fail.
Fourth, there is the unitary principle. New 
IRC section 965 creates more subpart F income for 
some foreign corporations. A state cannot assert 
that a part of this income is part of the income of a 
U.S. corporation unless those two firms constitute 
a unitary business.26 This is true whether a state is 
a combined reporting state or a separate reporting 
state.27
Fifth, states need to attend to the past. Any 
state tax on the repatriated income needs to 
include some safety valve in the (unlikely) 
scenario that some portion of that income has 
been taxed already. For instance, suppose a state 
requires worldwide combination, and a 
corporation did not make a water’s-edge election; 
in that case, the income earned by a foreign 
corporation that is part of the unitary group has 
been taxed.28
Sixth, states need to attend to the possibility of 
nonbusiness income. Some of the repatriated 
income might arguably represent investment 
income.29 In such a scenario, the income cannot be 
apportioned, but must be allocated.
Seventh, the states cannot mix and match tax 
principles.30 Consider California. As a large-
market state that uses single-sales-factor 
apportionment, California is in a strong position 
to tax a sizable percentage of the repatriation as 
earned within California. If California does so tax 
the repatriation, it would be doing so according to 
the source principle. But California has another 
attractive option. Many of the big corporations 
that earned this foreign income are domiciled in 
California — think Apple, Google, Facebook, etc. 
California could instead tax on the basis of the 
residence principle. That is, California can tax all 
of Apple’s repatriated income, subject to foreign 
tax credits. Of course, if California went this route, 
it would tax Microsoft’s share of the repatriation 
very little, as it is not domiciled in California. It 
would be nice for California to be able to tax 
Apple based on residence and Microsoft based on 
source, but that is a clear violation of internal 
consistency. California must choose; except for 
California and maybe New York, the preference 
on revenue grounds should presumably be for the 
source principle. More importantly, the source 
principle is already at the heart of all state 
corporate income tax systems.
Eighth, states should act with sensitivity to 
retroactivity (due process) and contract clause 
issues. The deemed repatriation happened last 
year, and last year there were state law rules about 
how subpart F income was to be treated. Any new 
law will therefore raise retroactivity concerns; it 
23
We are not saying that a state could not choose to tax the 
repatriation as foreign income, just noting that this approach creates 
greater doctrinal complexity — complexity that a state need not engage 
with.
24
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
25
Container, 463 U.S. at 170 (internal citations omitted).
26
Allied Signal v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992).
27
A separate reporting state would have to enact a different statute so 
as to deem the repatriated income as income stripped out of 
corporations within the state. For some ideas about structures, see Mark 
J. Cowan and Kathy Hurley, “Receding Water’s Edge: State Efforts to Tax 
Corporations’ Foreign Tax Haven Income,” State Tax Notes, Nov. 2, 2015, 
p. 403.
28
See Wright, supra note 1.
29
Allied Signal, at 504 U.S. at 787-88.
30
Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
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will also raise objections to the extent it changes 
some aspect of a state’s earlier treatment of 
subpart F income. The limited U.S. Supreme 
Court case law on such matters gives the states a 
lot of leeway,31 as seems correct to us given the 
policy exigencies that states must cope with. 
Recent cases that have attracted a lot of attention 
in State Tax Notes indicate that state supreme 
courts have followed the high court’s lead; we are 
thinking of the various cases involving the 
apportionment election under the Multistate Tax 
Compact32 and also Dot Foods v. Washington 
Department of Revenue.33
Even if one grants that some of the recent 
disputes have represented hard cases (and we do 
so grant, though we think these cases correctly 
decided), a well-crafted tax on repatriation should 
be a much easier case. The federal tax law made 
very significant changes to the federal tax system 
in December 2017; it cannot be a violation of due 
process or the contract clause if a state makes 
reasonable alterations to its tax system in 
response within a reasonable time. Note the 
double “reasonable” here. As to timing, states 
need to move expeditiously. There is no fixed rule, 
but the longer the states take to act, the stronger 
the retroactivity challenge. As to other changes, 
the states are on the strongest ground when they 
make retroactive changes to specifically cope with 
changes that the federal tax law made last year — 
in this case new IRC section 965. Using a 
retroactive bill on repatriation also to deal with 
other aspects of state taxation not affected by the 
federal law would weaken the states’ case.
Tax Design
Our long discussion of principles allows us to 
conclude with a much shorter discussion of the 
design of the tax. There is more than one possible 
approach, but we conclude with a sketch of one 
possible approach in order to be helpful. 
Remember, one of our recommendations is to 
move expeditiously. Here are some features that 
we would recommend for a new tax.
The design should make it clear that the 
purpose in levying the tax is to reach repatriated 
earnings to the maximum extent permitted by the 
federal Constitution and that any income not 
apportionable should be subject to allocation.
The tax should be accompanied by findings 
that a significant source of the repatriation income 
was earned within the United States. We think a 
reasonable starting point for a percentage of the 
repatriation earned in the United States would be 
35 percent, which was the percentage of U.S. GDP 
to that of the OECD in 2013.34 This is a 
conservative estimate for many reasons, including 
that many OECD countries (for example, the 
Netherlands) were also tax havens, but we think 
this is a reasonable place to start. Taking the $2.6 
trillion figure, this means that $910 million of the 
repatriated income was earned domestically. 
Given the large number of years over which the 
repatriated earnings were earned, we think states 
should consider a very simple apportionment 
formula, such as state GDP to national GDP or 
state population to national population.
We think it appropriate to give corporations 
an opportunity to challenge the resulting 
apportionment of income. In most cases, it is hard 
to imagine a taxpayer carrying its burden, but 
there will be some cases for which we can imagine 
that a taxpayer will be able to show that for state 
tax purposes some income has already been 
taxed.
Then there is the question of the rate. We think 
a high rate would be appropriate, say the state’s 
regular corporate income tax rate plus 10 percent. 
Because this new tax is going to be imposed on a 
type of domestic income, then the state legislature 
should prepare findings to explain why this 
higher rate is reasonable. This should not be hard 
to do. These domestic earnings were stripped out 
of the state’s tax base by means of aggressive tax 
planning, and states are entitled to discourage 
such planning. Furthermore, the ability to engage 
in such tax planning is not evenly distributed and 
so the success of this planning placed the burden 
31
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31, 33 (1994) (“Provided that the 
retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate 
legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the 
wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the 
legislative and executive branches. . . . Tax legislation is not a promise, 
and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code.” 
(internal citations omitted)).
32
See, e.g., Gillette v. Department of Treasury, 878 N.W.2d 891 (2015), 
cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2157.
33
372 P.3d 747 (2016) (en banc), cert. denied 237 S. Ct. 2156.
34
“Gross National Income,” OECD (undated).
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on other taxpayers inequitably. Or, if the state 
could not shift the tax burden to less aggressive 
taxpayers or those with less flexible business 
models, then pressing state priorities, such as 
infrastructure, were deferred because of the loss 
of revenue. Catching up on poorly maintained 
infrastructure is more expensive, for example, 
than doing it right the first time. Finally, taxing a 
less elastic tax base is the height of (tax) 
rationality.35 States in effect reduce their tax rates 
very substantially to attract less mobile capital;36 
this would simply be an example of applying that 
concept in reverse.
The new law should contain a severability 
clause lest any provision, such as the higher rate, 
be found unconstitutional.37
Conclusion
In coming columns, we will have a lot to say 
about various other aspects of the changes 
wrought by the new federal law. The repatriation 
represents low-hanging fruit, but it is fruit that 
needs to be picked sooner rather than later — and 
with care. 
35
Gruber, supra note 14, at 592-93.
36
For discussion, see David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “Tax 
Cannibalization and State Government Tax Incentive Programs,” State 
Tax Notes, Oct. 17, 2016, p. 197.
37
Another complexity could be required if a court required inclusion 
of the foreign factors. Courts have not so required in similar cases to 
date. See Friedman et al. supra note 1. Furthermore, and crucially, this tax 
is aimed at domestic income. Along with a severability clause, states 
might nevertheless consider a backup formula for inclusion of the 
foreign factors, perhaps a ratio roughly modeled on California’s Cal. Rev. 
and Tax Code section 25110(a)(2)(A)(ii).
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